Prof Emler - Psychology
@12 on Wednesday, 03 May, 2000
16 lectures
change of time
1964 murder in New York � striking, because the murder appeared to be preventable. 38 people saw it happen, witnessed the attack take place. attacked outside a block of flats, murderer came back. raised questions about conditions under which people are prepared to intervene in emergencies to help strangers = a version of the �altruism question� � pro-social behaviour.
social psychologist � arranged for somebody to collapse on a path, divinity students going to a lecture on Good Samaritan, stepping over the person
the more people, the more diffused the sense of responsibility
research in areas, incl developmental, on pro-social behaviour
raised the q: what does it mean to be a social animal, and what kind are we?
Hobbes introduced the fiction that at some point, our ancestors invented society
��no arts, no letters; no siciety; and which is worse of all,
continual fear and dnager of violent death; and the life of man, solitary,
pooor, nasty, brutish and short.� � Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651)
implying that we are not naturally social animal
Industrial Revolution � went from close-knit communities, easy to monitor + sanction
people moved to huge conurbations of strangers
internal but internalised social inclinations � acquire through process of socialisation, from authority figures
Freud � view that have to tame natural baby inclinations to kill and have sex with mother
there is an opposition between what is natural to us (selfishness) and what is needed for society
born with no social impulses at all � they need to be drummed into us, to fit in with society
social psychology � the veneer of social civilisation is v thin, and the threats to it � the conditions which undermine them
shared culture determines in-group similarity, rather than genetic.
the model is interested in how we generate + sustain culture-specific
not interested in general biological similarities
Berger & Luckmann �Social construction of reality� � humans can end up believing/wanting/valuing almost anything, dependent on cultural standards
explains why Jews + Muslims don�t eat pork, in terms of economically sensible
we aren�t the only social animal on the planet � there are always other species which fit the definition
������� E. O. Wilson, 1974
corals � no pursuit of self-interest, only collective interest � so totalitarian, that there is no viable life except as joined to other coral
they build apartment-type blocks, divisions of labour, food storage for community use, systems of communication (ants chemical trails, bees dance to point to honey), altruism (sacrifice themselves for the collective � biologically designed for it, e.g. bee�s insides are ripped out when it stings)
wolves, primates, dolphins etc.
they are genetic competitors, unlike the sterile social insects � lower degree of self-sacrifice
but still high degree of co-operation
the social instincts are built-in, e.g. the social insects
\ system of communication
\ social influence
� stereoscopic colour vision
� bi-pedal gait (females: narrow birth canal, because engineering constrains a narrow pelvis for walking, so our babies are immature and highly dependent)
� large parietal lobes (compared with chimpanzees, re: spatial relations)
� opposable thumb (grasping + throwing)
� size - ancestors 3�5�, average man now 5�9�, 3000 yrs ago average 5�11� (our diet is more monotonous since agriculture)
� hairless bodies � heat loss (stamina), cleaner
Waddington (1960) �The ethical animal�
hunter-gatherer social adaptations:
� co-operative hunting � mass co-ordinated slaughter of animals
� food-sharing
� tool manufacture � other animals make tools, but not to the same extent
� husband-wife reciprocities
� symbolic communication
� rule-giving and rule-following
Robin Dunbar (1988)
� predator defence
� resource defence (defending against competitors)
� foraging efficiency
� infant care
co-operation always entails a degree of altruism. there is no immediate benefit to the self in this co-operation. others may benefit on this occasion. fair enough, so long as the net benefit in the long run exceeds aggregate costs
adapt to the environment at the level of groups
game theory � benefit from altruism. but benefit even more from living selfishly (free rider) in an altruistic group. � genetic dissemination.
so how can a society discourage free riders? otherwise, society wouldn�t be viable.
William Hamilton (1964)
the process of natural selection is not about individuals, but about a genetic pattern. some of us carry similar genetic patterns, because we�re biologically related. so it makes sense to incur costs for people biologically related to me.
r B > C
where�� r = biological relatedness of giver and receiver of benefit
B = benefit to receiver
C = cost of giver
but why co-operate with people who are not genetically related
most co-operation among social vertebrates is not unconditional � usually hinges on reciprocation (contingent on getting a repayment)
encapsulates the problem of the free rider
but defecting isn�t the sensible strategy in the long run, if you have to repeat the game with the same people
iterative game where each strategy plays every other strategy an unspecified number of times
tit-for-tat worked best of all � not unconditionally altruistic, but altruistic under certain conditions
but there are problems with this
allows humans to be intelligent adaptors to material environment � NO
the problems of material survival aren�t difficult enough to dictate the need for intelligence
other species can do trial and error too � the difference is that we do collective trial and error � stored knowledge
problem remains: what is there that is so difficult and intellectually demanding on a daily basis that you need a big brain for?
but the great developments in tools are unrelated to great developments in our brain
the big brain is necessary to solve the problem of keeping collective life going � so that you aren�t exploited by others or co-operation breaks down
relates almost linearly to the size of the social groups that the different species form
implies that we intelligent enough to deal with a human group of 150